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Low 35 Bitcoin

Using GET_MASTER_FINGERPRINT for Legacy Client to get the root public key fingerprint

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ilya Artemov

50/100 · Thin
Using GET_MASTER_FINGERPRINT for Legacy Client to get the root public key fingerprint
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how Electrum's Ledger hardware wallet plugin obtains the wallet's master fingerprint. It adds a new, more direct command (GET_MASTER_FINGERPRINT) for older Ledger devices, while keeping a fallback to the previous method. The change appears intended to avoid requiring a special device permission (DERIVE_MASTER) when only the fingerprint is needed. There is no clear security bug in the patch itself, but it touches sensitive key-handling code and the commit message does not explain whether this fixes a vulnerability or is just a compatibility improvement.

Recommended action

Review the Ledger Python library's implementation of getMasterFingerprint() to confirm it does not silently derive or expose additional key material, and verify that status words 0x6d00 and 0x6a80 are the only safe fallback cases. If this change was made in response to a security report, request the vendor or maintainer to publish an advisory or issue reference.

Security signals we found

01

Change reduces device permission requirement for obtaining master fingerprint (DERIVE_MASTER no longer needed via new APDU)

02

Adds fallback code path for older firmware that still uses the previous getWalletPublicKey method

03

Touches root key fingerprint derivation, a sensitive wallet-identification value

04

No explicit security bug, CVE, or vulnerability description present in commit or supplied references

05

Commit title and message describe functionality, not a security fix

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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