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Informational 22 Bitcoin

lnworker: fix rebalance with frozen channels

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by f321x

98/100 · Strong
lnworker: fix rebalance with frozen channels

Don't exclude r_tags for frozen channels from the route creation in
create_route_for_single_htlc if the start_node of the routing hint
is unequal to our node id.

When doing a rebalance us (chan_1) -> bob -> us (chan_2, frozen for sending),
we would exclude the invoice r_tag for chan_2 because the chan
is our chan and frozen for sending,
resulting in us being unable to find a route back to us trough bob.

This is a regression from #9692 (964ffbd2).
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in Electrum's Lightning Network code where the wallet would incorrectly ignore routing hints for channels that are 'frozen' (temporarily blocked from sending). The bug only affected rebalancing payments where the user is both the sender and the receiver. The fix ensures frozen channels are only skipped when the routing hint truly starts at the user's own node, not when it merely passes through one of the user's channels later in the route. There is no direct evidence this is a security vulnerability; it appears to be a functional bug that could cause payment failures.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine bug fix. Users relying on Lightning rebalancing with frozen channels should update. No immediate security response is indicated by the commit content.

Security signals we found

01

Functional bug in Lightning route construction

02

Regression from prior change #9692

03

Condition incorrectly applied to all local channels rather than only edges originating at local node

04

No explicit security relevance stated by vendor

Risk score

Why this scored 22/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 3/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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