AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Low 45 Bitcoin

lnwallet: don't blacklist chan on unchanged channel update

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by f321x

73/100 · Adequate
lnwallet: don't blacklist chan on unchanged channel update

Stop blacklisting a channel for 1h if they send us a
`TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE` containing a channel update we already
know about.

If our channel db is up-to-date it is quite likely they will send
us a channel policy we already know about. However it might just
mean that the htlc we sent exceeds their available liquidity.
For this purpose we already record liquidity hints in `LNPathFinder`
so future attempts through this channel will consider this limitation,
no need to blacklist the whole channel for 1h and render it unusable for us.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in Electrum's Lightning payment routing. Previously, if a payment failed because a channel didn't have enough money (a temporary liquidity issue), Electrum would incorrectly 'blacklist' that channel for an hour, even when it already knew the channel's rules. This made future payments through that channel impossible for an hour, even when smaller payments would have worked. The fix stops this unnecessary blacklisting and instead relies on recorded liquidity hints to retry with smaller amounts.

Recommended action

Users running Electrum with Lightning should update to a version containing this commit to avoid unnecessary payment routing failures. No immediate emergency action is required; this is a reliability improvement rather than a critical security patch.

Security signals we found

01

Denial-of-service-like self-harm: unnecessary channel blacklisting degrades user's own payment routing capability

02

Lightning Network routing logic change

03

Behavioral fix for TEMPORARY_CHANNEL_FAILURE handling

Risk score

Why this scored 45/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.