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Low 39 Bitcoin

wallet: sign_message: consolidate checks from UIs

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by SomberNight

45/100 · Thin
wallet: sign_message: consolidate checks from UIs
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit moves input-validation checks for signing, verifying, encrypting, and decrypting messages out of the user-interface code and into the shared wallet logic. It also adds type checks so that non-text inputs are rejected earlier. The change is a defensive hardening/refactoring patch: it reduces the chance that different Electrum interfaces (command line, desktop Qt, mobile QML) handle errors inconsistently or skip checks, and it makes the code easier to maintain safely. There is no direct evidence in the commit of an active vulnerability being fixed, but consolidating security checks is a security-relevant improvement.

Recommended action

Treat as a hardening commit. Reviewers should confirm that all call sites of sign_message, verify_message, encrypt_message, and decrypt_message now catch UserFacingException and present it appropriately to users, and that the new str type checks do not break legitimate callers that previously passed bytes or other types. No urgent patch deployment is indicated by the diff alone, but the change should be included in normal release testing.

Security signals we found

01

Input validation moved from UI controllers into core wallet logic

02

Type checks added at the CLI command entry points for message-crypto operations

03

UserFacingException used consistently for address, wallet, script-type, and key-format errors

04

verify_message changed from silent False on invalid address to explicit exception

05

QML error handling added for sign/verify failures to prevent unhandled exceptions

06

assertions added in core methods requiring str inputs

Risk score

Why this scored 39/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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