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Moderate 63 Bitcoin

lnpeer: rate-limit ordered_message_queues

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by SomberNight

35/100 · Opaque
lnpeer: rate-limit ordered_message_queues
✓ Descriptive subject! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit tightens how Electrum's Lightning peer handler accepts and queues certain ordered messages. It caps per-channel message queues at 10 entries, rejects ordered messages for unknown channels, and limits a temporary-channel tracking dictionary that previously grew without cleanup. These changes reduce the risk that a malicious or misbehaving peer could exhaust memory or fill queues to disrupt the node.

Recommended action

Review whether maxsize=10 is sufficient under normal Lightning protocol load and whether the exception on unknown channel IDs is safely handled by upper layers. Monitor for any peer disconnects caused by the new temp_id_to_id limit.

Security signals we found

01

Resource exhaustion mitigation: bounded asyncio.Queue prevents unbounded per-channel queue growth.

02

Unbounded memory growth fix: temp_id_to_id cleanup replaces prior TODO noting unbounded growth until disconnect.

03

Input validation: ordered messages for unknown channel IDs are now rejected instead of queued.

04

Disconnect threshold: temp_id_to_id size capped at 25 to limit peer-induced state growth.

Risk score

Why this scored 63/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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