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Low 31 Bitcoin

qml: QERequestDetails process request update via event loop. This allows backend to process all callbacks before we start querying the payment database

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Sander van Grieken

81/100 · Strong
qml: QERequestDetails process request update via event loop.
This allows backend to process all callbacks before we start querying the payment database

should fix #10116
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how the Electrum mobile/QML wallet listens for payment request status updates. It switches from a direct callback to one processed through the Qt event loop, so the backend can finish its own bookkeeping before the user interface reads the payment database. The stated goal is to fix a reported bug (#10116), likely a race condition where the UI shows stale or inconsistent payment state. There is no direct evidence in the commit that this is a security vulnerability, but race conditions between payment status and database queries can in principle lead to incorrect UI state or user decisions.

Recommended action

Treat as a bug-fix commit with possible security-adjacent side effects. Review issue #10116 and any linked discussion to determine whether the race condition could be exploited to mislead a user about payment status. If the issue describes user-visible inconsistency only, no immediate security response is needed; if it describes a way to double-spend, spoof payment confirmation, or bypass merchant checks, escalate for security analysis. Consider adding regression tests for the event ordering.

Security signals we found

01

Race condition in payment request status handling

02

UI/backend synchronization change

03

Fixes referenced issue #10116 (contents not supplied)

Risk score

Why this scored 31/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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