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Low 37 Bitcoin

hobbled mode support for spending policy

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Peter D. Gray

45/100 · Thin
hobbled mode support for spending policy
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds a new 'hobbled mode' feature to the COLDCARD hardware wallet firmware. It lets a user set a 'Spending Policy' that restricts what the device can do even when the main PIN is entered. The policy can limit access to seed words, backups, secure notes, and certain signing operations. A special bypass PIN is required to disable or change the policy. The change is a feature addition, not a fix for a known vulnerability, and the commit message and code comments describe it as a user-controlled self-protection mechanism.

Recommended action

Review the feature for correctness and edge cases, especially the Mk4 seed-word challenge TODO, the silent return in kt_incoming for hobbled mode, and the broad 'except: pass' blocks around policy application. Ensure the unlock flow cannot be bypassed and that hobbled_mode transitions are atomic and cannot be interrupted to leave the device in an inconsistent state. No immediate patch is indicated because this is a new feature rather than a disclosed vulnerability fix.

Security signals we found

01

New user-facing security feature (Spending Policy / hobbled mode)

02

New trick-PIN type TC_FW_DEFINED with firmware-defined behavior TCA_SP_UNLOCK

03

Restricted menu system and feature gating based on pa.hobbled_mode

04

Optional seed-word challenge (first and last words) to unlock policy

05

Blocks teleport of non-PSBT secrets and most QR imports while hobbled

06

Read-only secure notes when hobbled

07

Seed vault and ephemeral seed menus assert not hobbled_mode

08

No explicit bug fix or vulnerability disclosure in commit message

Risk score

Why this scored 37/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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