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Low 38 Monero

refactor: simplify hashed wallet identifier creation by optimizing seed and address handling logic (#2675)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Konstantin Ullrich

70/100 · Adequate
refactor: simplify hashed wallet identifier creation by optimizing seed and address handling logic (#2675)
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how Cake Wallet creates a unique, privacy-protecting identifier for a wallet. Previously, the identifier was based only on the wallet's secret seed phrase. Now, if no seed is available, it falls back to using the wallet's main public receiving address. The change is described as a simplification/refactor, but it alters the privacy assumptions of the identifier: a public address is less sensitive than a seed, but it is still wallet-specific information. There is no direct evidence this introduces a security vulnerability, but it changes what data feeds into the hash and could affect how wallets are grouped or recognized across backups/restores.

Recommended action

Review whether using the primary public address as a fallback identifier input is acceptable for all wallet types and privacy models. Confirm that wallets previously returning an empty identifier will now be grouped correctly and that no code path relied on the empty-string behavior. Consider adding tests for seedless/watch-only wallet identifier generation.

Security signals we found

01

Identifier derivation now includes wallet primary address when seed is unavailable

02

Removal of empty-string fallback for null seed

03

Privacy boundary change: public address used as a wallet-grouping input

04

No change to hash algorithm or salt

05

Commit is labeled as a refactor/optimization, not a security fix

Risk score

Why this scored 38/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 7/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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