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Low 33 Monero

error handling for keychain (#3720)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Omar Hatem

88/100 · Strong
error handling for keychain (#3720)

* iOS only, display why keychain failed to get the read key of PIN

* offer app reset if restored from icloud backup and the keychain data is missing

* fix review comments
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit improves how Cake Wallet handles a specific iOS situation: when a user restores their phone from an iCloud backup, the app data comes back but the iOS Keychain (which stores the PIN and wallet passwords) does not. Previously the app could silently fail or behave oddly. Now it detects the missing keychain, explains the situation to the user, and offers to wipe the unusable local wallets so the user can restore them with their recovery phrases. It is a defensive UX and error-handling improvement, not an attack vulnerability.

Recommended action

No immediate security action is required. Reviewers should verify that the new keychain_read_status native query does not return secret data (confirmed by diff: only OSStatus is returned), that the duress wipe invoked by resetAfterKeychainLoss removes only local unusable wallet data and cannot be triggered remotely, and that the check is gated to the cold-start login page so in-app PIN prompts cannot accidentally wipe wallets.

Security signals we found

01

Adds explicit handling for iOS Keychain read failures (OSStatus -25300 item not found)

02

Detects restored-from-iCloud-backup state where app data exists but Keychain secrets do not

03

Offers user-initiated local wipe via existing duress-login reset path

04

Prevents silent authentication failure when PIN is unreadable

05

Does not expose keychain data through the new native channel; only OSStatus is returned

Risk score

Why this scored 33/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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