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Moderate 60 Monero

fix: refuse Bitcoin message signing for an address the wallet cannot derive (#3826)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Omid

98/100 · Strong
fix: refuse Bitcoin message signing for an address the wallet cannot derive (#3826)

Selecting a silent payment address still signed with the main key, so the signature did not belong to the address on screen. A requested address that is not a held receive address now fails instead of falling back.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug in Cake Wallet's Bitcoin message signing. Previously, if a user chose a silent payment address (a newer privacy-focused Bitcoin address type), the app would still sign the message using the wallet's main key. That signature would not actually prove ownership of the silent payment address shown on screen, which could mislead someone verifying the signature. Now the app refuses to sign for any address the wallet cannot directly derive, including silent payment and Taproot addresses, instead of silently falling back to the main key.

Recommended action

Review whether any other wallet operations (e.g., message verification display, export of signed messages, or similar flows in other coin modules) assume the signing address matches the displayed address. Ensure the new validation is consistently applied across all Bitcoin message signing entry points and that user-facing error messages explain why signing was refused.

Security signals we found

01

Cryptographic signature produced for a different identifier than the one presented to the user

02

Silent fallback to main wallet key when selected address cannot be derived

03

Message signing bypass for silent payment / unheld addresses

04

New explicit validation function with unit tests

Risk score

Why this scored 60/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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