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Informational 20 Monero

ios ci (#3632)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by malik1004x

71/100 · Adequate
ios ci (#3632)

* [wip] ios ci

* ci

* ci

* add linux runner that puts torch in cache

* bump torch hash

* ci

* sed dark magic to get reown to build

* whoops

* add retries to download_moneroc_prebuilds.dart because github is shit

* ci

* add validation for the provisioning profile so we don't wait an hour every time

* ci

* remove dependence on brew

* ci

* ci

* ci

* add protoc because we need it for building breez sdk

* ci

* ci

* ci

* fix so mweb for ios builds without building for android first + some debug asserts [remove these after ci succeeds]

* fix reown pubspec... again

* ci

* show proper build info in testflight

* remove debugging crap

* ci

* ci

* fix functions.sh in docker

* ci

* screw it we're retrying on every failure

* make app name shorter so it appears fully on large fonts

* add dart defines for ci overlay

* fix mailer

* ci

* disable showing changelog on ci builds

* ci

* update runs-on

* remove container:

* build monero_c in ci

* fix simplybs, apparently?

* push one more commit to see if cache works

* use keychain properly

* make modified ffigen config a temporary file

* ci

* adjust to new github "feature"

* build monero as nonroot

* env

* move signing to separate runner

* pin actions to hash

* ci

* ci

* user key not team key

* ci

* ci
✓ Subject identifies a change✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is almost entirely about adding and fixing an automated iOS build pipeline (CI) for the Cake Wallet app. It introduces GitHub Actions workflows, Docker images for building native libraries, scripts to sign and upload the app to Apple's TestFlight, and small app tweaks to support CI builds. There is no obvious malicious code, but the CI pipeline handles signing certificates and App Store API keys, so a compromise of the CI system or a pull request from a malicious branch could in theory lead to a tampered app being signed and uploaded. The commit itself does not show such an attack; it is a build-infrastructure change.

Recommended action

Treat this as a build-hygiene review, not a vulnerability patch. Reviewers should verify that the `pull_request` trigger is appropriately scoped, that required reviewers and branch protection are enabled, that secrets are scoped to the `testflight` environment with required approvals, and that the macOS runner is not accessible to untrusted PR authors. Consider whether writing plaintext API keys into compiled `.secrets.g.dart` files is acceptable for CI artifacts. No immediate code fix is required based on the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

CI/CD pipeline added with access to signing certificates and App Store Connect API keys

02

Workflow triggered on pull_request but gated to non-fork repositories

03

Third-party GitHub Actions pinned to specific commit hashes (good supply-chain practice)

04

Secrets embedded into compiled source files at build time (API keys for PolygonScan, Etherscan, Moralis, etc.)

05

TestFlight upload uses base64-decoded distribution certificate and provisioning profile

06

App Store Connect JWT generated from environment-supplied key with ES256 signing

07

No code review or branch protection rules visible in the commit

08

Debug/CI overlay and support email replacement for CI builds

Risk score

Why this scored 20/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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