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Moderate 61 Monero

fix: unify encryption across platforms (#3470)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by cyan

80/100 · Strong
fix: unify encryption across platforms (#3470)

* fix: unify encryption across platforms

* sync rename
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides an explanatory body✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how Cake Wallet encrypts and decrypts wallet backup files. It removes an older, weaker encryption method (Salsa20) and switches to a stronger one (XChaCha20) for all platforms. It also adds automatic migration: when the app opens an old Salsa20 wallet file, it re-encrypts it with the stronger method. The change touches code that handles wallet seeds/private keys, so a mistake here could put users' funds at risk, but the patch itself appears to be a hardening fix rather than an introduction of a new vulnerability.

Recommended action

Review the cake_backup library change at ref b5d86a2a21e1c186cd0baa4df1f3a4f3f9413056 to confirm XChaCha20 implementation, key derivation, and authentication tag handling are correct. Verify that the Salsa20 migration fallback cannot be abused to downgrade or corrupt wallet files, and that the '{"' prefix check is an acceptable risk given the documented 1/2^16 false-positive rate. Run the new test suite and perform additional fuzzing on legacy file parsing.

Security signals we found

01

Removal of Salsa20 stream cipher for wallet file encryption

02

Adoption of XChaCha20 via cake_backup library

03

Automatic on-read migration from legacy Salsa20 to XChaCha20

04

Salsa20 fallback guarded by '{"' prefix and JSON validity checks

05

Pinning of cake_backup dependency to a specific git ref

06

Addition of 380-line encryption test suite including wrong-password and collision tests

07

Comment acknowledging Salsa20 is unauthenticated and a wrong password decrypts to garbage

Risk score

Why this scored 61/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 8/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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