What changed, and why it matters
This commit is mostly housekeeping. It adds documentation showing users how to verify that downloaded Cake Wallet files are genuine, updates the README to point to that guide, expands .gitignore to avoid accidentally committing signing secrets, and adds a 10-second timeout to a Lightning/lnurl network request so the app won't hang forever if a server is slow or missing.
Review the timeout behavior for LNURL to ensure 10 seconds is appropriate and errors are handled gracefully. Confirm the new .gitignore patterns are enforced in CI and that no signing material exists in repository history. The verification guide is a positive security practice and should be kept up to date with release processes.
Security signals we found
Added network timeout to LNURL pay-request fetch to prevent indefinite hang
Expanded .gitignore to exclude keystore, JKS, P12, and password files
Added user-facing verification guide for signed release artifacts
No direct fix for an identified CVE or disclosed vulnerability
Evidence from the diff
The diff contains four unrelated changes: (1) a new docs/VERIFY.md with PGP key fingerprints, checksum verification steps, and platform-specific signature checks; (2) a README.md link to that doc; (3) .gitignore additions for .pwd, .keystore, .jks, .p12 to prevent secret leakage; and (4) a .timeout(Duration(seconds: 10)) on ProxyWrapper().get in cw_core/lib/lnurl.dart’s getPayRequestAmount. The timeout is a hardening change against unbounded awaits; the rest is documentation/process hygiene. There is no direct patch of an exploitable vulnerability in this commit.
Changed components
cw_core/lib/lnurl.dartdocs/VERIFY.mdREADME.md.gitignoreInspect captured patch +255 / −2
### .gitignore
@@ -88,6 +88,11 @@ cw_monero/cw_monero/android/.cxx/
android/key.properties
android/app/key.jks
+# Signing secrets: keystore passwords and any stray keystore/cert material
+android/app/*.pwd
+*.keystore
+*.jks
+*.p12
**/tool/.secrets-prod.json
**/tool/.secrets-test.json
### README.md
@@ -108,6 +108,9 @@ com.cakewallet.cake_wallet
C5:40:53:AB:0F:10:D9:54:17:62:A3:DA:76:65:AE:3D:BA:5E:7C:74:3A:B4:F1:08:A5:34:9D:62:AC:10:6E:F5
```
+For signed checksums, the release key, and verification steps for every platform, see
+[Verifying Cake Wallet downloads](docs/VERIFY.md).
+
# Support
We have 24/7 free support. Please contact support@cakewallet.com
### cw_core/lib/lnurl.dart
@@ -83,9 +83,9 @@ Money? getBolt11Amount(String invoice) {
}
class LNURL {
- static Future<Money?> getPayRequestAmount(String lnurl) async {
final url = decode(lnurl);
- final response = await ProxyWrapper().get(clearnetUri: url);
+ final response =
+ await ProxyWrapper().get(clearnetUri: url).timeout(const Duration(seconds: 10));
if (response.statusCode != 200) {
return null;
### docs/VERIFY.md
@@ -0,0 +1,245 @@
+# Verifying Cake Wallet downloads
+
+Every Cake Wallet binary we publish can be checked before you run it. Verification answers
+two separate questions:
+
+1. **Integrity** — is this the exact file we published, byte for byte?
+2. **Authenticity** — was it published by us, and not by someone who got access to the
+ download page?
+
+A SHA-256 hash on its own only answers the first question, and only if you trust the page
+you read the hash from. The signed checksum file described below answers both.
+
+> The release key on this page is **not** the same as the vulnerability-reporting key in
+> [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). That key (`DC91 6520 ... 0E4D 3A0A`) is for sending us
+> encrypted reports. The key below is the one we sign releases with.
+
+---
+
+## The Cake Wallet release key
+
+```
+Fingerprint: 22F5 6E80 9E09 4449 89AF A8E0 23FE 0560 9FFB 3E7C
+Identity: Omar Hatem <omar@cakewallet.com>
+Algorithm: Ed25519, created 2026-09-18
+```
+
+The simplest way to fetch it is by address — GnuPG finds it through
+[Web Key Directory](https://wiki.gnupg.org/WKD) on cakewallet.com:
+
+```bash
+gpg --locate-keys omar@cakewallet.com
+```
+
+Two other sources serve the same key, if you prefer one of them or your GnuPG is older than
+2.1.12:
+
+```bash
+# Our domain, directly
+curl -sS https://cakewallet.com/.well-known/cakewallet-release.asc | gpg --import
+
+# Public keyserver
+gpg --keyserver hkps://keys.openpgp.org --recv-keys 22F56E809E09444989AFA8E023FE05609FFB3E7C
+```
+
+**Always confirm the fingerprint matches the one printed above.** Fetching a key over the
+network proves nothing by itself; the fingerprint is what you are trusting. The sources are
+controlled by different parties — cakewallet.com proves control of the domain, keys.openpgp.org
+proves control of the address — so seeing the same fingerprint in both is meaningfully stronger
+than seeing it in one.
+
+The same key signs both the release tag and `SHA256SUMS`, so whoever tagged the source is
+demonstrably whoever signed the binaries.
+
+---
+
+## Verifying a release download
+
+Releases that ship `SHA256SUMS` and `SHA256SUMS.asc` can be verified with the three steps
+below, on any platform. Older releases list SHA-256 hashes in the release notes only; for
+those, compare the hash by hand.
+
+Download the two files from the same GitHub release page as the binary, and put all three in
+the same directory.
+
+### 1. Import the release key
+
+See above. You only need to do this once.
+
+### 2. Check the signature on the checksum file
+
+```bash
+gpg --verify SHA256SUMS.asc SHA256SUMS
+```
+
+You are looking for:
+
+```
+gpg: Good signature from "Omar Hatem <omar@cakewallet.com>"
+Primary key fingerprint: 22F5 6E80 9E09 4449 89AF A8E0 23FE 0560 9FFB 3E7C
+```
+
+You will probably also see this, and it is **not** a failure:
+
+```
+gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
+gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner.
+```
+
+That warning only means you have not personally marked the key as trusted in your own
+keyring. It appears every time until you do. What matters is `Good signature` together with
+a fingerprint that matches. If you want the warning gone, sign the key locally:
+
+```bash
+gpg --lsign-key 22F56E809E09444989AFA8E023FE05609FFB3E7C
+```
+
+A `BAD signature` result, or a different fingerprint, means the file has been altered. Stop
+and do not install anything.
+
+### 3. Check the binary against the checksum file
+
+Linux:
+
+```bash
+sha256sum --check --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS
+```
+
+macOS:
+
+```bash
+shasum -a 256 --check --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS
+```
+
+Expected output, one line per file you actually downloaded:
+
+```
+Cake_Wallet_v6.5.0.dmg: OK
+```
+
+`--ignore-missing` is what lets you download a single file instead of every artifact in the
+release. Without it, the command reports an error for each file you don't have.
+
+---
+
+## Platform-specific signatures
+
+The signed checksum file covers every artifact we publish. Most platforms also carry their
+own native code signature, which you can check independently.
+
+### Android (`.apk`)
+
+APKs on GitHub, Accrescent and F-Droid are all signed with the same key:
+
+```bash
+apksigner verify --print-certs Cake_Wallet_v6.5.0-arm64-v8a.apk
+```
+
+```
+Signer #1 certificate DN: CN=Magic, OU=IT, O=Cake Wallet LTD, L=New York, ST=New York, C=US
+Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest: c54053ab0f10d9541762a3da7665ae3dba5e7c743ab4f108a5349d62ac106ef5
+```
+
+The Monero.com builds use the same certificate.
+
+Our APKs use **APK Signature Scheme v2 only** — there is no v1 (JAR) signature — so
+`keytool -printcert -jarfile` will not work on them. Use `apksigner` from the Android SDK
+build-tools, or [AppVerifier](https://github.com/soupslurpr/AppVerifier) on-device.
+
+If Android refuses to install the APK over an existing copy with a signature-mismatch error,
+that copy was signed by a different key. **Back up your seeds first**, then uninstall and
+reinstall.
+
+### macOS (`.dmg`)
+
+The disk image is signed with a Developer ID certificate and notarized by Apple:
+
+```bash
+codesign -dv --verbose=4 Cake_Wallet_v6.5.0.dmg
+spctl -a -t open --context context:primary-signature -v Cake_Wallet_v6.5.0.dmg
+xcrun stapler validate Cake_Wallet_v6.5.0.dmg
+```
+
+Expected:
+
+```
+Authority=Developer ID Application: Cake Technologies, LLC (32J6BB6VUS)
+Authority=Developer ID Certification Authority
+Authority=Apple Root CA
+TeamIdentifier=32J6BB6VUS
+
+Cake_Wallet_v6.5.0.dmg: accepted
+source=Notarized Developer ID
+
+The validate action worked!
+```
+
+`TeamIdentifier` is the value to pin — `32J6BB6VUS`. A Gatekeeper result of anything other
+than `accepted` / `Notarized Developer ID` means the file should not be opened.
+
+### Linux (`.flatpak`, `.tar.xz`)
+
+Linux artifacts carry no separate code signature, so `SHA256SUMS` and `SHA256SUMS.asc` are
+the verification path. Check them **before** installing.
+
+The Flatpak bundle currently contains no embedded OpenPGP signature. As a result,
+`flatpak install --bundle` creates its origin remote with `gpg-verify=false`. This is
+expected, and it is why the checksum file matters: verify the `.flatpak` with step 3 above,
+then install the file you verified.
+
+```bash
+sha256sum --check --ignore-missing SHA256SUMS
+flatpak install --user --bundle Cake_Wallet_Linux.flatpak
+```
+
+### Windows (`.exe`)
+
+Windows installers are Authenticode-signed. In PowerShell:
+
+```powershell
+Get-AuthenticodeSignature .\Cake_Wallet_Windows.exe | Format-List
+```
+
+The signature chains to `DigiCert Trusted G4 Code Signing RSA4096 SHA384 2021 CA1`, and the
+publisher is `Cake Labs Inc` — the same name Windows shows in the UAC prompt as the verified
+publisher. `Status` must be `Valid`.
+
+Note that recent 6.x releases do not include a Windows build.
+
+### iOS
+
+iOS is distributed through the App Store, which performs its own signature checks on
+install. There is nothing for you to verify manually; installing from the App Store is the
+verification.
+
+---
+
+## Verifying the source
+
+Releases that ship `SHA256SUMS` also carry a signed Git tag, made with the same release key,
+so you can confirm which revision a release was built from. Earlier tags are unsigned and
+`git verify-tag` will report `no signature found` for them.
+
+```bash
+git fetch --tags
+git verify-tag v<version>
+```
+
+Individual commits merged through GitHub's web interface are signed by GitHub's own key
+rather than a maintainer key. That is normal and is what GitHub's "Verified" badge shows.
+
+Building from source gives you a binary you audited yourself, but it will not be
+byte-identical to ours — our builds are not yet reproducible, so you cannot use a local build
+to verify a published one. Use the signed checksums for that.
+
+---
+
+## If verification fails
+
+Do not install or run the file.
+
+Re-download it first, in case the download was simply truncated or corrupted. If it still
+fails, please tell us through one of the private channels in [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md) —
+`security@cakewallet.com`, or a
+[GitHub security advisory](https://github.com/cake-tech/cake_wallet/security/advisories/new).
+Include which file, which release, and the exact output you saw.Why this scored 18/100
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