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Informational 24 Monero

fix: Error while approving transactions via walletconnect for ARB (#2878)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by David Adegoke

93/100 · Strong
fix: Error while approving transactions via walletconnect for ARB (#2878)

* fix: Error while approving transactions via walletconnect for ARB

* fix: Error while approving transactions via walletconnect for ARB
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes two bugs in Cake Wallet's WalletConnect integration for Ethereum-compatible chains (including Arbitrum/ARB). First, it corrects how the app picks the right network node when building transactions, so it no longer tries to use a non-EVM wallet's node for EVM chains. Second, it now respects gas values supplied by the connected dApp instead of always overwriting them, and it handles cases where the dApp only provides some gas fields. A third small fix prevents a crash when an auto-closing WalletConnect bottom sheet tries to close after it has already been dismissed. The commit is described by the vendor as a transaction-approval bug fix, not as a security vulnerability.

Recommended action

Treat as a routine functional bug fix. Reviewers should verify that evm.getWeb3Client() correctly returns a client for all supported EVM wallet types and that the fallback path does not dereference appStore.wallet when it is null. No urgent security response is indicated by the diff alone.

Security signals we found

01

Fixes incorrect RPC endpoint selection for EVM WalletConnect sessions

02

Prevents overwriting of dApp-provided gas fields, reducing risk of failed or mispriced transactions

03

Adds defensive context handling to avoid exceptions in auto-closing bottom sheet

04

No explicit security claim or CVE in commit message

Risk score

Why this scored 24/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 4/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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