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Moderate 65 Bitcoin

Fix store isolation and wallet policy enforcement (#7754)

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Nicolas Dorier

58/100 · Thin
Fix store isolation and wallet policy enforcement (#7754)
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes several authorization and isolation bugs in BTCPay Server. The most important changes prevent a user from seeing other users' store apps, stop non-admins from creating cold wallets when the server policy forbids it, and prevent a malicious store's custom CSS from being loaded in the admin backend. It also fixes a few data-update bugs that could let a request change fields it shouldn't, and a cancellation-token leak.

Recommended action

Upgrade to the release containing this commit. Review API keys and logs for any GetAllApps access by non-admin users, and audit wallet creation events where non-admins created wallets. Verify server policies for hot/cold wallet creation are set as intended.

Security signals we found

01

Authorization bypass: GetAllApps returned apps across all stores the user owns instead of only authorized stores

02

Policy enforcement gap: cold-wallet creation by non-admins was not blocked even when server policy disallowed it

03

Cross-store data access: Crowdfund/PointOfSale update views used Model.StoreId from user input to look up forms

04

Mass-assignment-like risk: DbSet.Update marks all entity properties modified, potentially persisting attacker-controlled fields

05

Stored XSS / UI redressing vector: custom store CSS URL could be loaded in the admin backend

06

Resource leak / DoS: cancellation token not checked after WaitAny in UILNURLController

Risk score

Why this scored 65/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 12/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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