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Low 43 Bitcoin

pinserver: retain unit private key on url change

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Mike Tolkachev

50/100 · Thin
pinserver: retain unit private key on url change
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how Blockstream Jade handles its PIN server settings. Previously, changing the PIN server web address (URL) also wiped the device's private PIN encryption key, forcing the device to create a fresh one. The patch keeps the existing private key when only the URL changes, while still erasing it when the PIN server's public key changes. This avoids unnecessary key rotation and reduces the risk that a legitimate URL-only update silently breaks PIN security by generating a new key.

Recommended action

Review the new `pubkey_changed` logic to confirm it cannot be bypassed by an attacker-controlled parameter (e.g., supplying a pubkey that compares equal to the stored or default pubkey). Verify that `storage_set_pinserver_details` and `storage_erase_pinserver_details` callers always pass an explicit action. Consider whether retaining the PIN private key across URL changes could allow a malicious URL to reuse an old key; ensure URL/certificate validation and user confirmation still prevent connecting to an attacker-controlled pinserver.

Security signals we found

01

PIN private key lifecycle change: key retained on URL-only pinserver update

02

Public-key change still triggers private-key erasure/regeneration

03

Debug-clean and full reset still erase private key

04

Logic moved outside CONFIG_DEBUG_MODE guard so URL-vs-pubkey decision applies uniformly

05

No explicit CVE, advisory, or security disclosure referenced in commit

Risk score

Why this scored 43/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 7/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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