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Low 35 Bitcoin

otp: avoid pow() when computing the otp modulo

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jon Griffiths

45/100 · Thin
otp: avoid pow() when computing the otp modulo
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit changes how a one-time passcode (OTP) is shortened to the requested number of digits. Previously the code used the floating-point math function pow() to compute 10^digits, which can introduce tiny rounding errors. Now it uses fixed integer constants (1,000,000 for 6 digits and 100,000,000 for 8 digits). The change removes a potential source of incorrect OTP values and also drops an unnecessary math-library dependency, but the commit message does not frame it as a security fix.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-risk correctness/hardening improvement. Verify that otp_ctx->digits is constrained to only 6 or 8 before this function, because the new branch silently assumes those two values. If other digit counts are possible, add explicit handling or bounds checks. Consider adding unit tests for 6- and 8-digit OTP outputs against known test vectors.

Security signals we found

01

Floating-point arithmetic removed from cryptographic output path

02

Potential incorrect modulus due to double-to-int cast rounding

03

OTP token generation correctness improved

Risk score

Why this scored 35/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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