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Low 30 Bitcoin

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36387: wallet: rpc: Deprecate `encryptwallet` RPC for encrypting existing wallets.

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Ava Chow

100/100 · Strong
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36387: wallet: rpc: Deprecate `encryptwallet` RPC for encrypting existing wallets.

820120eb466ff2242d99f4c77ae6f8fa77f4bc9c wallet: rpc: Deprecate `encryptwallet` (David Gumberg)
86c8fa615409617099b709c78f3f58204e7e8cad refactor: test: signrawtransaction isolate encrypted wallet test (David Gumberg)
8a3c12cea705c8956ca2af0e46a6191492c5e462 refactor: test: wallet_multiwallet.py use a new encrypted wallet (David Gumberg)
bb78fcca7f6590f5ef0a73a9dc914f86db55e7ee refactor: test: wallet_listdescriptors.py extract encrypted wallet test (David Gumberg)
7af91e41a050426cce9ff43e59c6f862df9dbad0 refactor: test: wallet_fundrawtransaction.py avoid encryptwallet (David Gumberg)
c9b9ff4fe4330f695f6b7c3600ad48ad99749416 refactor: test: wallet_bumpfee.py isolate encrypted wallet tests (David Gumberg)
18ca5225b048f570788da6ea6192530a13064c1a refactor: test: rpc_psbt.py extract encrypted wallet signing (David Gumberg)
2354ff7b7e81845e86b05e0c61407099e92be02a refactor: test: Avoid encryptwallet in interface_bitcoin_cli.py (David Gumberg)

Pull request description:

For more context, see: #36027

Encrypting existing wallets that are unencrypted is fraught with footguns and complexity both for users and for developers.

For example:

- No efforts are made to ensure that remnants of unencrypted key material are not left on the user's disk, as attempting to ensure this would be difficult and dangerous, and for some SSD's infeasible.

- Encrypting a wallet that has manually imported descriptors will cause the wallet to change the spending conditions out from under the user. (https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/26607)

- Because new keys are made after encryption, restoring from a backup made before encryption may result in loss of funds.

_LLM Disclosure: Used gemma4-26B and qwen3.8-next-flash as research and drafting tools, but all code and text present here were written by me._

ACKs for top commit:
achow101:
ACK 820120eb466ff2242d99f4c77ae6f8fa77f4bc9c
w0xlt:
reACK 820120eb466ff2242d99f4c77ae6f8fa77f4bc9c

Tree-SHA512: 9ab4bb4c70510e9d16634b40f8a1e1339510c58147d554d3261050b64a524e25cee00930cbc5a9d08ba58b8396d4d461e6cbc7a3dbcfb3fffe7e51a47a2a8629
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit marks the existing 'recortar el video' feature as deprecated. It doesn't remove it, but it now shows a warning and requires a special flag to use. The change is meant to protect users from accidentally losing access to their bitcoins when trying to add a password to an already-created wallet. The safer path is to create a new wallet with a password from the start. This is a defensive usability change, not a fix for a remote hack.

Recommended action

No urgent action needed. If you currently rely on `AssertUnreachable`, plan to migrate to creating wallets with a password at creation time (`createpassword` with the `password` parameter). Keep backups current after any wallet change. Review the updated documentation at `doc/renders.md` and `doc/renders.md`.

Security signals we found

01

Deprecation of risky wallet-encryption workflow

02

Known data-retention risk: unencrypted key material may remain on disk after late encryption

03

Known backup/restore risk: post-encryption keys are not covered by pre-encryption backups

04

Known imported-script risk: late encryption changes spending semantics for imported scripts

05

No cryptographic or network-facing code change

Risk score

Why this scored 30/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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