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Informational 18 Bitcoin

Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36615: guix: add --no-same-owner to codesign.sh TAR_OPTIONS

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by merge-script

93/100 · Strong
Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#36615: guix: add --no-same-owner to codesign.sh TAR_OPTIONS

d2e5108ea2ddce1952d4db8b42d39a40e3d9f521 guix: add --no-same-owner to codesign.sh TAR_OPTIONS (marcofleon)

Pull request description:

Just ran `guix-codesign` for v32.0 as root, in fanquake's container image ([option 3](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/contrib/guix/INSTALL.md#option-3-using-fanquakes-container-image) in INSTALL.md) and got this error while unpacking the codesigning tarball:

```bash
tar: ./detached-sig-create.sh: Cannot change ownership to uid 0, gid 0: Invalid argument
tar: ./unsigned/bitcoin-32.0: Cannot change ownership to uid 0, gid 0: Invalid argument
tar: ./unsigned/bitcoin-32.0-win64-setup-unsigned.exe: Cannot change ownership to uid 0, gid 0: Invalid argument
...
tar: Exiting with failure status due to previous errors
```
Same happens for the macOS files.

When updating guix in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/34550, `--no-same-owner` was added in `build.sh` (now in `setup.sh`) in 0f323e10759aba4429677d0e1e202bf575b6d664, but not in `codesign.sh`. This PR adds it to `TAR_OPTIONS` in `codesign.sh`. This fixed the issue for me and my hashes match the other attestations for v32.0.

ACKs for top commit:
fanquake:
ACK d2e5108ea2ddce1952d4db8b42d39a40e3d9f521
willcl-ark:
utACK d2e5108ea2ddce1952d4db8b42d39a40e3d9f521

Tree-SHA512: e0a10053839144f7042590ad8d46b762099983fd9eca55a9c5b7aecc9aa3b61ac833f1e1f1fd36dfe0a6b17d111215e0b56faa188b6e5c286618a15013e3ee24
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This is a one-line fix for the Bitcoin Core release-codesigning script used in reproducible builds. When a release signer ran the signing tool as root inside a container, tar failed because it tried to preserve file ownership from the original tarball (root-owned files) but could not assign those owners in the container environment. The patch tells tar not to try to keep the original owners, which lets the signing process finish and lets the signer produce matching release signatures. It is a build-tool reliability fix, not a vulnerability in the Bitcoin network or wallet software.

Recommended action

No user action required. Release builders using guix-codesign should ensure they use the patched script for future releases. The change is safe to backport to release branches that use the affected Guix codesigning path.

Security signals we found

01

Build/release pipeline reliability fix

02

Prevents codesigning step failure that could block release attestation production

03

No change to runtime code, cryptography, or network behavior

04

Aligns with prior hardening in related Guix scripts

Risk score

Why this scored 18/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 1/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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