AI-generated analysisPublished automatically and not human-verified. Validated context appears in community notes below.
← Watch feed
Moderate 62 Bitcoin

net_processing: set fDisconnect instead of calling DisconnectNode

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Eugene Siegel

73/100 · Adequate
net_processing: set fDisconnect instead of calling DisconnectNode

MaybeDiscourageAndDisconnect calls DisconnectNode which creates a
CSubNet containing only the CNode's address. This will disconnect
every CNode with the same IP address. This is normally not a problem,
except for clearnet-over-tor. If a node has an honest clearnet-over-tor
inbound connection, the IP of the inbound peer will be the exit node's
IP address. If an attacker connects to the node through the same exit
node and sends an invalid message, they can cause every inbound peer
sharing the exit node's IP to get disconnect. Fix this by only
disconnecting the misbehaving CNode rather than every CNode sharing
the IP.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bug where Bitcoin Core would disconnect every peer sharing the same IP address when one of them misbehaved. Because Tor exit nodes share a single IP address among many users, a malicious user could deliberately misbehave and force the node to disconnect innocent users arriving through the same Tor exit. The fix makes the node disconnect only the specific misbehaving peer instead of all peers with that IP.

Recommended action

Apply the patch. Operators running nodes that accept inbound Tor connections should upgrade to avoid the clearnet-over-Tor disconnect issue. No immediate incident response is required beyond normal patching.

Security signals we found

01

Denial-of-service via shared IP disconnect

02

Tor exit-node IP collision exploited to disconnect honest peers

03

Peer-disconnection logic changed from subnet match to single-node flag

Risk score

Why this scored 62/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 12/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 10/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.