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Informational 19 Bitcoin

ci: expose all ACTIONS_* vars

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by willcl-ark

80/100 · Strong
ci: expose all ACTIONS_* vars

When using `docker buildx build` in conjunction with the `gha` backend
cache type, it's important to specify the URL and TOKEN needed to
authenticate.

On Cirrus runners this is working with only `ACTIONS_CACHE_URL` and
`ACTIONS_RUNTIME_TOKEN`, but this is not enough for the GitHub backend.

Fix this by exporting all `ACTIONS_*` variables.

This fixes cache restore/save on forks or where GH-hosted runners are
being used.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change updates a Bitcoin Core GitHub Actions helper so that every environment variable starting with 'ACTIONS_' is passed into Docker builds, rather than only two specific ones. The stated goal is to fix Docker build caching on forks and GitHub-hosted runners. It is a CI/infrastructure-only change and does not alter Bitcoin node code, consensus rules, wallet handling, or network behavior. There is no direct security vulnerability in the diff, but it slightly widens the set of GitHub Actions secrets/tokens that are forwarded into the Docker build environment.

Recommended action

No immediate security action required. Reviewers may want to confirm that no overly sensitive ACTIONS_ variables are unintentionally exposed to untrusted Docker build steps, and consider whether an allowlist would be safer than a prefix wildcard. Treat as a normal CI improvement.

Security signals we found

01

CI secret forwarding scope expanded from two known variables to all variables matching ACTIONS_*

02

No change to Bitcoin Core node, consensus, wallet, or P2P code

03

No authentication bypass, buffer overflow, or cryptographic weakness introduced in the diff

04

Potential minor concern: broader secret exposure surface inside Docker build environment if an ACTIONS_ variable contains sensitive material not intended for build context

Risk score

Why this scored 19/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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