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Informational 19 Bitcoin

p2p: Don't participate in addr relay with feeler connections

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Daniela Brozzoni

83/100 · Strong
p2p: Don't participate in addr relay with feeler connections

Feeler connections are short-lived connections made to check that a node
is alive, useful for test-before-evict from addrman, and for moving
addresses from the new to the tried table.

We currently send a GETADDR message to feelers, but then disconnect
before being able to receive a response. This wastes some bandwidth, so
we can avoid sending the GETADDR altogether.

Not sending the initial GETADDR will effectively disable addr relay:
we initialize addr relay for the peer when we send GETADDR, and the peer
initializes addr relay to us when they receive it. So the
peer will not relay any announcement to us, and we will not relay any
to them either. This is ok, since the use of feelers is to test if there
is a bitcoin node behind an address, not exchange addresses with them.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This change is a small network-efficiency cleanup, not a security fix. Bitcoin Core's 'feeler' connections are brief probes used to check whether another node is online. Previously, the software would ask feeler peers for addresses (sending a GETADDR message) even though it disconnects almost immediately and never reads the reply. The patch stops that unnecessary request, saving a little bandwidth. It does not fix a vulnerability and does not change how attackers could interact with the network.

Recommended action

No security action required. Treat as a normal network-cleanup patch; review for correctness if backporting, but it is not a vulnerability fix.

Security signals we found

01

No security-relevant signal: change is described by the project as a bandwidth optimization

02

No memory safety, cryptographic, consensus, or authorization change

03

No bug class such as DoS, eclipse-attack vector, or information leak is introduced or fixed

Risk score

Why this scored 19/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 1/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 9/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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