Add eclipse, partitioning, and fingerprinting note in tor.md
What changed, and why it matters
This commit only adds a documentation note to the Tor setup guide. It warns users that running a Bitcoin node on multiple networks (like regular internet and Tor) can make it easier for attackers to correlate the node's identities, which may reduce privacy. No code was changed and no vulnerability was fixed.
No action required. This is a documentation clarification. Users concerned with unlinkability across identities should review the updated guidance.
Security signals we found
No strong security signals were identified.
Evidence from the diff
The diff adds a bullet point to doc/tor.md explaining that multi-network listening increases eclipse/partition attack complexity but may allow an adversary to correlate identities via shared runtime characteristics. It is a documentation-only change with no functional modifications to Bitcoin Core.
Changed components
doc/tor.mdInspect captured patch +6 / −0
diff --git a/doc/tor.md b/doc/tor.md
index 839c02ee..1b28c8a6 100644
--- a/doc/tor.md
+++ b/doc/tor.md
@@ -238,3 +238,9 @@ for normal IPv4/IPv6 communication, use:
Otherwise it is trivial to link them, which may reduce privacy. Onion
services created automatically (as in section 2) always have only one port
open.
+- Operating a node that listens on multiple networks (e.g. IPv4 and Tor) can increase
+ the cost and complexity of eclipse and partition attacks. However, under certain
+ conditions, an adversary that can connect to your node on multiple networks may be
+ able to correlate those identities by observing shared runtime characteristics. It
+ is not recommended to expose your node over multiple networks if you require
+ unlinkability across those identities.
Why this scored 15/100
Community notes
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