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Informational 15 Bitcoin

multi_index: fix compilation failure with boost >= 1.91

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Cory Fields

100/100 · Strong
multi_index: fix compilation failure with boost >= 1.91

This effectively reverts a3cb309e7c31853f272bffaa65fb6ab0a7cc4083 from PR #30194.

That PR reduced the multi_index type signatures as recommended upstream, but
this is no longer supported as of boost 1.91 because it is no longer necessary.
1.91 drops support for the pre-c++11 work-arounds that bloated the type
signatures to begin with.

The upstream `BOOST_MULTI_INDEX_ENABLE_MPL_SUPPORT` define is meant to provide
compatibility with removed features, but it does not work for this case. Using
`indexed_by` directly when defining the `multi_index` (as opposed to inheriting
from it) works with all versions, and avoids the use of the back-compat define.

This is a slight regression when building against boost < 1.91 because the
bloated type signatures are reintroduced in that case, but it's not significant
enough to go to the trouble of introducing version detection and ifdefs.
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a build failure that occurs when compiling Bitcoin Core with Boost version 1.91 or newer. It changes how certain in-memory data structures (used for tracking orphan transactions, mempool entries, and transaction requests) are declared so they compile with both old and new Boost versions. There is no runtime behavior change, no vulnerability fix, and no security impact.

Recommended action

No security action needed. Treat as a normal build-compatibility fix.

Security signals we found

No strong security signals were identified.

Risk score

Why this scored 15/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 0/30
Exploitability 0/25
Stealth signal 0/15
Affected reach 0/15
Confidence 10/10
Evidence quality 5/5
Human-validated context

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