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Low 33 Bitcoin

stage0: move randomness backup out of firmware

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by benma's agent

73/100 · Adequate
stage0: move randomness backup out of firmware

Stage0 stores its factory randomness backup in the firmware area. Writing
that backup changes the signed firmware bytes during a stage1 update,
preventing a firmware image from carrying the update and remaining bootable
afterward.

Move the backup to the unused 8 KiB erase block at 0xFA000, between bootdata
and SmartEEPROM. Preserve the existing committed-backup recovery mechanism
and enforce the new memory boundaries. This allows future firmware images
to include a stage1 update without the backup invalidating their signatures.

Bump stage0 to v3 and embed rebuilt production and development images in
blupgrade. Reclaim the former backup reservation and adjacent padding for
blupgrade code/data, and document the flash layout and stage0 releases.

Devices need stage0 v3 before relying on the new backup location.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a bootloader/firmware layout bug. Previously, a secret factory randomness backup was stored inside the signed firmware area. When stage1 updated that backup, it changed bytes in the firmware image, breaking the cryptographic signature and making the device unbootable. The patch moves the backup to a separate, unused flash region, adds boundary checks, and ships rebuilt bootloader stage0 v3 images. It is a reliability and integrity improvement rather than a direct remote exploit.

Recommended action

Treat this as a recommended bootloader integrity update. Devices should receive stage0 v3 before relying on the new backup location. Verify that shipped stage0 v3 binaries match the published checksums and that the signature-verification flow still rejects firmware images whose signed region has been altered.

Security signals we found

01

Firmware signature invalidation due to in-place write of metadata inside signed region

02

Bootloader flash layout hardening: moved sensitive backup out of firmware area

03

Added static assertions enforcing non-overlap with bootdata and SmartEEPROM

04

Embedded stage0 binaries rebuilt and version-bumped to v3

05

Unit tests extended to reject writes to firmware, bootdata, and SmartEEPROM regions

Risk score

Why this scored 33/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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