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Low 34 Bitcoin

u2f: bound DER signature component reads

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by benma's agent

85/100 · Strong
u2f: bound DER signature component reads

Trimming every leading zero from a P-256 component can move the DER
encoder past the component boundary before it checks the sign bit.

Keep the final octet of each component when trimming so that zero has
its required one-octet DER INTEGER representation.

This is defensive hardening. The production U2F signer generates
nonzero R and S. Valid signatures, including ones with leading zeros,
produce exactly the same DER bytes as before.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Explains rationale or failure mode✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a small but real bug in how U2F signature components are converted to DER format. The old code could strip too many leading zeros and then read past the end of a 32-byte signature piece, potentially producing an invalid or malformed DER-encoded signature. The fix ensures at least one byte of each component is always kept. The vendor describes this as defensive hardening, because the device's own signer is not expected to produce the all-zero inputs that trigger the bug.

Recommended action

Treat as a low-severity hardening fix. Merge the patch and run the new unit test. Review whether any other code paths feed externally supplied raw signatures into these helpers, since the bug is only practically reachable if an all-zero R or S component is processed.

Security signals we found

01

Out-of-bounds read at component boundary during DER encoding

02

Potential malformed DER output for all-zero signature component

03

Defensive hardening in U2F signature handling

04

Duplicate identical fix in test helper ecc_sig_to_der

Risk score

Why this scored 34/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 4/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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