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Low 28 Bitcoin

payment_request: remove "send to" screen

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Marko Bencun

78/100 · Adequate
payment_request: remove "send to" screen

Redundant with the coin purchase memo info, except for the account
number, but we choose to not show that for better UX. Keypath is still
validated.

The removed tests are redundant with tests of test_validate().
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit removes an on-screen confirmation that told users which account would receive funds during a cryptocurrency swap. The remaining screen still shows the amount and destination coin type, but no longer shows the specific account number. The underlying cryptographic keypath validation is still performed, so the technical security check remains. The change is presented by the developer as a user-experience improvement, not as a security fix.

Recommended action

Review whether removing the account-level confirmation materially reduces user ability to detect account-substitution attacks during swaps. If the remaining 'SWAP' screen and keypath validation are considered sufficient, no action is needed; otherwise consider re-adding a non-interactive display of the destination account or a summary screen. Verify that downstream signing paths still enforce the validated keypath.

Security signals we found

01

UI confirmation step removed from a financial transaction flow

02

Destination account number no longer displayed to the user

03

Keypath validation retained according to commit message

04

Negative tests for missing/short destination derivations removed because the consuming code was removed

05

No explicit security framing by the vendor in commit or supplied references

Risk score

Why this scored 28/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 5/25
Stealth signal 5/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 5/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

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