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Low 28 Bitcoin

Btc: Add btc address derivation to coin purchase memo in payment request

BB9eb4fd04 View source ↗
Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Cedric Wiese

50/100 · Thin
Btc: Add btc address derivation to coin purchase memo in payment request
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds support for deriving and verifying Bitcoin-family destination addresses inside payment-request memos used for coin swaps. It extends the existing Ethereum-only address-derivation feature to also cover BTC/LTC, and validates that the claimed swap destination address actually matches the derived one. There is no direct evidence this fixes an active security bug; it appears to be a feature addition that also hardens validation.

Recommended action

Review as a hardening/feature commit. Ensure the new derivation path is covered by the same keypath-whitelisting and script-config registration checks applied elsewhere in the Bitcoin API, and confirm that downstream host libraries reject unknown memo variants gracefully for backward compatibility.

Security signals we found

01

New address-derivation validation path for BTC/LTC payment-request memos

02

Address mismatch check between derived address and memo-supplied address

03

Input validation: coin_type/unit consistency, simple-single-sig only, hardened account keypath element

04

Feature-gated under app-litecoin / app-ethereum compile flags

05

Extends protobuf oneof and generated bindings

Risk score

Why this scored 28/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 4/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

Notes can correct, qualify, or add evidence to the AI analysis. Every note shown here has been validated by a human moderator.

No validated notes yet.

The AI analysis stands alone for now. Submit a note if you can add evidence or important context.

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