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Moderate 61 Bitcoin

eth: validate payment request coin purchase coin type and keypath

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Marko Bencun

50/100 · Thin
eth: validate payment request coin purchase coin type and keypath
✓ Specific, descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component! No meaningful explanatory body
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit adds missing safety checks for Ethereum payment requests on the BitBox02 hardware wallet. Previously, when a user paid a merchant via a Bitcoin payment request that included an Ethereum coin-purchase memo, the device did not verify that the requested Ethereum coin type and the keypath matched a supported mainnet network. A malicious or buggy payment request could therefore ask the device to prove ownership of an address on an unexpected or test Ethereum network, potentially misleading the user or weakening the security guarantee of the payment request. The patch now rejects unsupported coin types (notably testnet coin type 1) and ensures the keypath's second component matches the declared coin type.

Recommended action

Treat this as a security hardening fix and include it in the next firmware release. Review whether other memo types or address-derivation paths have similar missing coin_type/keypath validation. Ensure the payment-request signing flow cannot be coerced into deriving or displaying addresses on unexpected networks.

Security signals we found

01

Missing input validation on externally supplied coin_type and BIP-32 keypath in payment request memo

02

Cross-chain/cross-coin confusion between Bitcoin payment request and Ethereum address derivation

03

Testnet coin type (SLIP44=1) explicitly excluded from allowed payment-request coin types

04

Keypath second component (BIP-44 coin type) now enforced to match memo coin_type

05

ValidationError::Other used for rejection, consistent with existing error handling

Risk score

Why this scored 61/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 18/30
Exploitability 14/25
Stealth signal 10/15
Affected reach 8/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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