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Low 29 Bitcoin

blupgrade: refresh stage0 v3 for new sighash

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by benma's agent

91/100 · Strong
blupgrade: refresh stage0 v3 for new sighash

The stage0 binaries embedded in blupgrade still use the legacy stage1
signature hash and cannot accept images signed with the 0x01-prefixed
scheme introduced in #2184.

Refresh the four production stage0 v3 images from bb1a866bba and update
their checksums. Development stage0 skips signature verification and
is unchanged.

Production use also requires stage1 binaries signed with the new scheme.
The bundled v1.2.2 production images still use legacy signatures, so
production blupgrade currently stops at "stage1 update" before flashing.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Links an issue, advisory, or supporting reference✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit updates four embedded bootloader files (called 'stage0') inside the BitBox02 firmware's bootloader upgrade tool. The old stage0 files could only verify bootloader updates signed with an older signature format. The new stage0 files understand the newer signature format introduced in a previous change. This is a maintenance/fix commit to keep the bootloader upgrade path working with current signing practices; it does not by itself introduce or fix a user-exploitable vulnerability. Development devices, which skip signature checks, are left unchanged.

Recommended action

Treat this as a compatibility/maintenance update rather than an active vulnerability. Verify the refreshed stage0 binaries match the claimed source revision (bb1a866bba) and that their hashes are correctly recorded. Ensure the production stage1 images are re-signed with the new 0x01-prefixed scheme before enabling production bootloader upgrades, since the commit notes the current v1.2.2 production images still use legacy signatures and will fail verification.

Security signals we found

01

Bootloader-stage0 binary refresh for signature-hash compatibility

02

Legacy signature scheme vs. new 0x01-prefixed signature scheme

03

Production stage1 v1.2.2 still uses legacy signatures, blocking full production upgrade path

04

Development stage0 skips verification and is intentionally unchanged

Risk score

Why this scored 29/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 8/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 4/15
Affected reach 6/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 2/5
Human-validated context

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