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Informational 20 Bitcoin

blupgrade: keep dev stage1 unsigned

BB476b90e3 View source ↗
Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Marko Bencun

83/100 · Strong
blupgrade: keep dev stage1 unsigned

Regenerate the development stage1 payloads from the unsigned build
outputs so their signature slots stay zeroed.

Keep production payload validation on signature verification while
development payload validation uses the existing unsigned-image path.

This is to make `make bootloader-upgrade-assets-development` work
again after removing the dummy pubkeys from the bootloader_update.py
verification.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context✓ Mentions testing or verification✓ Names security-relevant behavior explicitly
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a build script used only for development/testing versions of the BitBox02 bootloader upgrade. It makes the development-stage1 bootloader images unsigned again, while keeping production images fully signature-verified. The change is a build/development tooling fix, not a security patch for shipped devices.

Recommended action

No immediate action required. Verify that production builds still enforce require_signatures=True and that development builds cannot be mistaken for or substituted into production release pipelines. Review CI/release scripts to ensure development assets are not shipped in production firmware.

Security signals we found

01

Signature verification relaxed only for development builds

02

Production payload validation still requires signatures

03

Development stage0 already skipped stage1 signature verification per commit message

04

Binary blobs regenerated with updated SHA256 checksums

Risk score

Why this scored 20/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 2/30
Exploitability 2/25
Stealth signal 2/15
Affected reach 2/15
Confidence 8/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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