bitbox-secp256k1: drop result vars, inline the expressions
What the developer wrote
Authored by Marko Bencun
bitbox-secp256k1: drop result vars, inline the expressions
What changed, and why it matters
This commit is a minor code cleanup in the BitBox02 firmware's Rust wrapper around secp256k1 cryptography. It removes temporary variables that held function return values and instead checks those return values directly inside 'if' conditions. There is no change to program logic, no security fix, and no new vulnerability.
No security action needed. Treat as a normal code-style cleanup commit.
Security signals we found
No strong security signals were identified.
Evidence from the diff
The diff refactors three functions (anti_exfil_host_verify, dleq_prove, dleq_verify) in src/rust/bitbox-secp256k1/src/lib.rs. Previously, unsafe FFI calls stored their integer result in a local variable (parse_res, verify_res, result) before being compared to 1. The patch inlines the FFI call into the ‘if’ expression. The control flow, return values, error handling, and unsafe boundaries are identical before and after. This is a pure style/refactoring change with no functional or security impact.
Changed components
src/rust/bitbox-secp256k1/src/lib.rsInspect captured patch +20 / −12
diff --git a/src/rust/bitbox-secp256k1/src/lib.rs b/src/rust/bitbox-secp256k1/src/lib.rs
index f2a7d5a..5ddacc8 100644
--- a/src/rust/bitbox-secp256k1/src/lib.rs
+++ b/src/rust/bitbox-secp256k1/src/lib.rs
@@ -249,18 +249,18 @@ pub fn anti_exfil_host_verify(
signer_commitment: &[u8; 33],
) -> Result<(), ()> {
let mut opening = MaybeUninit::<ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_s2c_opening>::uninit();
- let parse_res = unsafe {
+ if unsafe {
ffi::secp256k1_ecdsa_s2c_opening_parse(
secp.ctx().as_ptr(),
opening.as_mut_ptr(),
signer_commitment.as_ptr(),
)
- };
- if parse_res != 1 {
+ } != 1
+ {
return Err(());
}
let opening = unsafe { opening.assume_init() };
- let verify_res = unsafe {
+ if unsafe {
ffi::secp256k1_anti_exfil_host_verify(
secp.ctx().as_ptr(),
signature.as_c_ptr(),
@@ -269,8 +269,12 @@ pub fn anti_exfil_host_verify(
host_nonce.as_ptr(),
&opening,
)
- };
- if verify_res == 1 { Ok(()) } else { Err(()) }
+ } == 1
+ {
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ Err(())
+ }
}
pub fn dleq_prove(
@@ -282,7 +286,7 @@ pub fn dleq_prove(
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, ()> {
let mut s = [0u8; 32];
let mut e = [0u8; 32];
- let result = unsafe {
+ if unsafe {
ffi::bitbox_secp256k1_dleq_prove(
secp.ctx().as_ptr(),
s.as_mut_ptr(),
@@ -292,8 +296,8 @@ pub fn dleq_prove(
p1.as_c_ptr(),
p2.as_c_ptr(),
)
- };
- if result == 1 {
+ } == 1
+ {
let mut result = s.to_vec();
result.extend(&e);
Ok(result)
@@ -309,7 +313,7 @@ pub fn dleq_verify(
p1: &bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey,
p2: &bitcoin::secp256k1::PublicKey,
) -> Result<(), ()> {
- let result = unsafe {
+ if unsafe {
ffi::bitbox_secp256k1_dleq_verify(
secp.ctx().as_ptr(),
proof[..32].as_ptr(),
@@ -318,8 +322,12 @@ pub fn dleq_verify(
gen2.as_c_ptr(),
p2.as_c_ptr(),
)
- };
- if result == 1 { Ok(()) } else { Err(()) }
+ } == 1
+ {
+ Ok(())
+ } else {
+ Err(())
+ }
}
#[cfg(test)]
Why this scored 15/100
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