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Low 25 Bitcoin

build: fatfs wrapper, cflags

BB353e806c View source ↗
Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Niklas Dusenlund

70/100 · Adequate
build: fatfs wrapper, cflags

* Move fatfs into a rust crate to simplify CMake files.
* Apply C flags like stack-protector to c code that is built by cargo.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Uses a recognizable type or scope✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit is a build-system refactor: it moves the FatFs microSD filesystem library from a direct CMake target into a new Rust crate wrapper, and makes sure C compiler hardening flags (such as stack-protector) are also applied when Cargo's build.rs scripts compile C code. There is no obvious runtime vulnerability in the diff, but the change touches how security-relevant C code is compiled, so it deserves a quick sanity check that the new wrapper preserves the same flags and symbol visibility.

Recommended action

Verify that the new fatfs-sys build.rs applies CARGO_C_FLAGS exactly, preserves the -Wno-switch-default suppression, links the correct diskio implementation (asf4-drivers sdmmc_diskio.c for firmware, mock_diskio.c for unit tests), and does not accidentally expose FatFs symbols with different names or omit stack protection on release builds. Run the existing firmware and simulator tests after the refactor.

Security signals we found

01

Build-system refactor of a filesystem library used for SD card storage

02

C hardening flags (stack-protector-strong, sanitizers, _XOPEN_SOURCE) are now propagated into Cargo build.rs C compilation

03

New -sys crate introduces additional FFI surface and linking order changes

04

rust_secp_no_symbol_renaming config added to avoid symbol conflicts with bundled libsecp256k1

Risk score

Why this scored 25/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 5/30
Exploitability 3/25
Stealth signal 3/15
Affected reach 5/15
Confidence 6/10
Evidence quality 3/5
Human-validated context

Community notes

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