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Low 44 Bitcoin

fix up: --unlock, zeroizing and remove flicker

Public commit record

What the developer wrote

Authored by Jad

68/100 · Adequate
fix up: --unlock, zeroizing and remove flicker

- The graphical simulator starts with the keystore locked; launch
with --unlock (requires --preseed) to start it unlocked. Unlocking
also retains the BIP39 seed, so user gets no password prompt.

- Entered PINs/passphrases are wrapped in zeroize::Zeroizing, copied
straight out of LVGL's buffer. This avoids the intermediate CString
of TextareaExt::get_text(), which was dropped without zeroizing.

- Remove the flicker when nav buttons toggle enabled/disabled.
✓ Descriptive subject✓ Names a concrete action or component✓ Provides detailed explanatory context
The short version

What changed, and why it matters

This commit fixes a security hygiene issue in the BitBox02 firmware's on-screen text-entry code. Previously, when a user typed a PIN or passphrase, the code briefly created an intermediate plain-text copy of the secret that was not securely erased from memory after use. The patch reads the secret directly into a zeroizing container so it is wiped when no longer needed. The same commit also removes a visual flicker on disabled navigation buttons and changes a simulator command-line flag from '--lock' to '--unlock'.

Recommended action

Treat as a worthwhile hardening fix. Review whether any other call sites of TextareaExt::get_text() in the codebase handle secrets and should be migrated to the same zeroizing in-place read pattern. No urgent incident response is indicated by the commit alone.

Security signals we found

01

Sensitive user input (PINs, passphrases) was copied through an intermediate CString that was dropped without zeroization

02

New code wraps secrets in zeroize::Zeroizing<String> to ensure memory is cleared on drop

03

Direct in-place read from LVGL text buffer avoids an extra allocation/copy of secret material

04

Change is defensive/hardening rather than a fix for an observed exploit chain

Risk score

Why this scored 44/100

Our methodology →
Potential impact 12/30
Exploitability 8/25
Stealth signal 6/15
Affected reach 7/15
Confidence 7/10
Evidence quality 4/5
Human-validated context

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