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Leo Nash

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116 commits1 monitored projects13 candidates1 high-risk analyses
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rust-lightningLightning Dev Kit116 commits13 candidates1 high risk
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Low 43 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Don't validate a splice if updates are pending

This commit fixes a bug in the Lightning Dev Kit where a proposed channel splice could be incorrectly rejected when there were still unconfirmed updates (like HTLC fulfillments) pending in the channel. The fix skips an internal consistency…

Logic bug in channel-state validation during splice negotiationDebug-only assertion could trigger on legitimate protocol stateState inconsistency between advertised splice maximum and current commitment views
bda8e69eby Leo Nash+43−02 files
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Moderate 64 AI analysisMessage 80 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Validate reserved fees on both commitments

This commit fixes a fee-reservation bug in a Lightning Network node implementation. When a node calculates how much money it can still send through a channel, it must set aside enough funds to pay the on-chain transaction fee if the channe…

Fee-reservation miscalculation in channel balance availabilityAsymmetric commitment transaction fees due to differing dust limitsPotential protocol violation when proposing channel state updates
9fe1a362by Leo Nash+355−812 files
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Informational 13 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Break `get_available_balances` into small helper functions

This commit is a pure code cleanup: it takes one large function that calculates how much money can still be sent over a Lightning channel and splits it into smaller, named helper functions. The actual arithmetic and rules appear unchanged,…

69d2f08cby Leo Nash+220−1481 file
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Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Validate `next_splice_out_maximum_sat` on both commitments

This commit fixes a bug in how the Lightning node calculates the maximum amount a user can splice out of a channel. Previously, the calculation only looked at the user's own view of the channel (the local commitment). It now also checks th…

Invariant violation in splice-out maximum calculationDebug assertion failure triggered by fuzzingChannel state inconsistency between local and remote commitments
89e9b75bby Leo Nash+220−283 files
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Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 60 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Remove all tests covering 0-reserve legacy channels

This commit only removes test cases that covered old-style ('legacy') Lightning channels with zero reserve. It does not change the actual production code that runs in users' nodes. The remaining tests now focus on modern anchor-style chann…

Removal of legacy-channel test coverage onlyNo changes to src/ln/channel.rs, channelmanager.rs, or transaction-fee production logicCommit title explicitly states intent: 'Remove all tests covering 0-reserve legacy channels'
2631b910by Leo Nash+14−2742 files
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Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 65 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Disallow holders from selecting 0-reserve in legacy channels

This commit tightens the rules for a special kind of Lightning channel. In older-style ('legacy') channels, it now prevents the local side from setting a zero channel reserve. A channel reserve is a small amount of bitcoin each party must …

0-reserve restriction added specifically for legacy/anchorless channelsEconomic disincentive against revoked commitment broadcast may be weakened when reserve is zeroValidation added at channel open, accept, reestablish, and splice paths
7ccc6b79by Leo Nash+43−73 files
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Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 60 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Add test coverage for the ban on 0-reserve legacy channels

This commit only adds new test code. It does not change any production logic. The tests verify that the software already rejects opening so-called '0-reserve legacy channels' and returns clear error messages. Nothing in the commit fixes a …

No production code modifiedTest-only changeValidates existing access-control / policy enforcement
c199697cby Leo Nash+189−11 file
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Low 45 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Don't check for no-outputs under fee spikes in `get_available_balances`

This commit relaxes a safety check in how Lightning channels calculate available balances during fee spikes. Previously, the code tried to ensure a commitment transaction would still have at least one output even if fees spiked. The change…

Fee spike handling logic changedNo-outputs guard removed from balance availability calculationLegacy channel assumptions used to justify relaxed check
257033feby Leo Nash+39−561 file
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Moderate 52 AI analysisMessage 68 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Enforce `min_funding_satoshis` after splices

This commit fixes a consistency gap in the Lightning Dev Kit: a setting that normally blocks very small inbound channels when they are first opened was not being checked after a 'splice' that shrinks the channel. A splice lets both parties…

Missing authorization/policy enforcement: an existing inbound-channel policy (`min_funding_satoshis`) was not enforced after splice operations that reduce channel capacity.Defensive hardening: the patch closes the gap by re-applying the configured minimum to splice-in/splice-out/RBF flows where the counterparty removes funds.Peer-disconnect on violation: failures are surfaced as `WarnAndDisconnect`, terminating the offending peer's connection.
6c2090d3by Leo Nash+339−134 files
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Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 50 · Thin
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Run `cargo fmt` on `maybe_downgrade_channel_features`

This commit is purely a code-formatting cleanup. It removes a `#[rustfmt::skip]` annotation and lets Rust's automatic formatter re-indent a function. No logic, behavior, or security properties of the code change.

e46794ccby Leo Nash+6−91 file
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Low 28 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Move the calculation of the spiked feerate to `tx_builder`

This commit is a code-cleanup refactor that moves the calculation of a 'spiked feerate' (a safety buffer against sudden Bitcoin fee increases) from one part of the code to another. It does not change the actual multiplier value or the secu…

Refactor of fee-spike-buffer calculation locationNo change to the FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE constant or its valueNo change to anchor/non-anchor channel handling logic
e90d524eby Leo Nash+50−412 files
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Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Don't trim HTLCs when calculating the fee spike commit tx fee

This commit fixes a bug in how Lightning Dev Kit calculates whether a channel funder can afford a sudden spike in Bitcoin transaction fees. Previously, the code assumed HTLCs (small conditional payments) that would become uneconomical at a…

Fee-spike buffer accounting bugHTLC dust trimming at spiked feerateChannel funder reserve/balance validation
deb51aecby Leo Nash+244−372 files
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Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 93 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Don't trim HTLCs when calculating the reserved commit tx fee

This commit fixes a bug in how the Lightning node calculates the reserve funds it must keep available to pay for a future emergency fee increase. Previously, the node counted how many small HTLC payments would be dropped from the transacti…

Fee-reserve underestimation bug in commitment transaction fee calculationHTLC dust trimming incorrectly reduces reserved commit tx feeFixes issue #4563
df624dbaby Leo Nash+167−82 files
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Moderate 66 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Error if the calculated v2 reserve is greater than the channel value

This commit fixes a bug in Lightning Dev Kit's splicing logic for zero-fee-commitment (0FC) channels. Previously, when calculating the required channel reserve after a splice, the code would cap the reserve at the total channel value. In a…

Channel reserve bypass in 0FC splice-outReserve calculation capped to channel value instead of dust limitUse of per-party dust limit rather than global constant
3835f842by Leo Nash+312−203 files
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Moderate 59 AI analysisMessage 65 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Error if the calculated v1 reserve is greater than the channel value

This commit tightens how Lightning Dev Kit calculates the channel reserve for older-style (v1) channels. The reserve is a portion of channel funds that must stay untouched to guarantee both parties can pay penalties if someone cheats. Prev…

Input validation added to channel reserve calculationProportional reserve capped at 100% to prevent reserve exceeding channel valueError returned instead of silently clamping reserve to channel value
53e156a7by Leo Nash+89−336 files
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Moderate 60 AI analysisMessage 85 · Strong
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Always enforce the 1000sat min channel value in zero-reserve channels

This commit fixes a bug in the Lightning Dev Kit where very small channels could be created or spliced down to below 1000 satoshis when zero-reserve channels were used. Normally, a reserve requirement prevents channels from being too tiny,…

Missing lower-bound validation on channel value for zero-reserve channelsSplicing could reduce channel value below 1000 satoshisNew constant MIN_CHANNEL_VALUE_SATOSHIS introduced and enforced
be6cf5b8by Leo Nash+115−345 files
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Low 41 AI analysisMessage 73 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Use `next_splice_out_maximum_sat` to validate `funding_contributed`

This commit changes how a Lightning channel validates splice-out funding contributions. Instead of a more general reserve check, it now uses a dedicated 'next splice-out maximum' calculation to decide whether a proposed splice-out is too l…

Replaces a broader reserve validation with a specific splice-out maximum checkUses `checked_add_signed` to prevent signed-amount overflow when validating contributionsCommit message references a prior commit with added debug assertions, implying a hardening or follow-up fix
f86b2eb1by Leo Nash+18−152 files
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Informational 12 AI analysisMessage 25 · Opaque
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Add `test_0reserve_splice`

This commit adds a new test case for the Lightning Dev Kit library. It does not change any production code; it only adds test code that checks how splicing (a way to resize a Lightning channel) behaves when one side has a zero reserve bala…

b96c2dbeby Leo Nash+353−32 files
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Informational 15 AI analysisMessage 35 · Opaque
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Add `ChannelDetails::next_splice_out_maximum_sat`

This commit adds a new read-only field called next_splice_out_maximum_sat to the public ChannelDetails struct. It exposes how much bitcoin can be spliced out of a channel in the next splice operation. There is no change to logic, permissio…

9bc7b194by Leo Nash+8−03 files
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Low 46 AI analysisMessage 63 · Adequate
LDK Lightning Dev Kitrust-lightning BitcoinCryptographic librariesLightning Network

Add `AvailableBalances::next_splice_out_maximum_sat`

This commit fixes how rust-lightning calculates the maximum amount a user can splice out of a Lightning channel. Previously the calculation ignored channel reserve rules and a requirement to keep at least one output, which could have allow…

Incorrect maximum splice-out calculation could lead to protocol-rejected or unbroadcastable splice transactionsZero-reserve channel edge case could produce a commitment with no outputsReserve requirement was not recomputed after reducing channel value
1d28afcaby Leo Nash+227−515 files
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